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ABSTRACT 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina, the federal law enforcement 
community has not adopted the level of emergency preparedness recommended or 
instructed by national directives, studies, and after-action reports. The importance of 
preparedness has been identified in numerous studies regarding the need for coordinated 
efforts on federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Failure to prepare and train employees 
has resulted in tort claims against local agencies and potential increased legal liability for 
the federal government. 
Through an analysis of specific costs and benefits of preparedness adoption and 
compliance, this thesis concludes that measurable and anticipated benefits often exceed 
costs for agencies. Analysis reveals that financial incentives, through the many federal 
preparedness grant programs, have encouraged preparedness adoption and compliance by 
state, local, and tribal governments. However, the federal law enforcement community, 
without access to these grants, has not achieved a level of preparedness adoption and 
compliance, raising the question: Would a new financial incentive concept designated for 
the federal law enforcement community increase preparedness adoption and compliance?  
Research indicates that a novel federal financial incentive concept would in fact 
increase preparedness adoption and compliance within the federal law enforcement 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The federal law enforcement community has not adopted a level of emergency 
preparedness, as recommended or instructed by numerous national directives, plans, 
policies, studies and after-action reports, in order to prepare our nation to respond to 
future man-made attacks and natural disasters. The importance of preparedness for man-
made and natural disasters has been identified in numerous documents and studies 
examining the response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and other 
significant incidents requiring coordinated efforts by numerous agencies on the federal, 
state, local, and tribal levels. The failure to prepare and train responding employees has 
resulted in the imposition of legal liability against local governments and potential 
liability for the federal government.  
The level of federal law enforcement preparedness adoption and training 
compliance has been sporadic and quite often at a lower level than that of state, local, and 
tribal agencies. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), no federal department or agency has formally 
reported its preparedness adoption and compliance to FEMA.  
The importance of preparedness adoption and compliance for the federal law 
enforcement community can be debated by responders and policy makers since 
emergency response is not the primary responsibility of many of the federal law 
enforcement departments and agencies. However, those federal departments and agencies 
need to be prepared to respond to the incidents under their jurisdiction and must plan to 
support other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies during significant incidents when 
existing resources are overwhelmed. If the federal law enforcement community does not 
expect to respond to another significant national incident in the future, it has not 
adequately studied the past or properly anticipated the future.  
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If preparedness is encouraged, or mandated as an important segment of homeland 
security by the federal government, ought the federal government adhere to its own 
requirements and recommendations as part of the national strategy? Has the federal 
government adhered to its own preparedness requirements? If not, what would encourage 
an enhanced culture of preparedness within the federal law enforcement community, and 
would financial incentives and benefits increase adoption and compliance? 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
State and local governments have achieved preparedness compliance largely due 
to financial incentives from the federally administered Homeland Security Grant Program 
and other federal funding sources. State and local governments have also been the subject 
of tort claims and other legal actions for failure to train their personnel or prepare them 
for their duties; such litigation has encouraged state and local governments to enhance 
training and preparedness. Since the federal government has not achieved a similar level 
of preparedness adoption and compliance, would a new financial incentive concept 
encourage and enable the federal law enforcement community to increase its 
preparedness compliance? If so, how would such a program work? What are the 
anticipated costs and benefits? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The importance of preparedness adoption and compliance has been addressed in 
numerous national directives, plans, policies, studies, and after-action reports. From 
empowering documents to after-action reports, the benefits of national preparedness have 
been discussed, studied, and analyzed by the public and private sectors. 
1. Empowering Documents 
In addition to the perceived and demonstrated value of preparedness in a post-
9/11 world, as identified in many incident after-action reports, the primary reason for 
preparedness adoption and compliance is the direction and guidance provided in several 
important empowering and directing homeland security documents. Homeland Security 
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Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” established the 
foundation for the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National 
Response Plan (NRP) for federal, state, local, and tribal preparedness and incident 
management (White House, 2003a). HSPD-5 directed federal departments and agencies 
to adopt and use NIMS for emergency prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. 
HSPD-5 also directed federal departments and agencies to participate in the NRP (White 
House, 2003a, Goal 18). HSPD-5 directed the head of each federal department and 
agency to revise its plans in accordance with the NRP by June 1, 2003, and to submit a 
plan to adopt and implement NIMS by August 1, 2003 (White House, 2003a, Goal 19). 
HSPD-8, “National Preparedness,” functions as a companion to HSPD-5 to 
describe how the federal departments and agencies shall prepare to respond to an incident 
through the establishment of national preparedness goals (White House, 2003b, Goals 3 
and 5). Department and agency heads are directed to undertake actions to support the 
federal preparedness goals (White House, 2003b, Goal 20). 
The “National Strategy for Homeland Security” (White House, Office of 
Homeland Security [OHS], 2002, p. x) addressed emergency preparedness and response 
through federal, state, and local coordination through 12 initiatives. The “National 
Strategy for Homeland Security” (White House, Homeland Security Council [HSC], 
2007) expanded the strategy to a larger all-hazards approach for federal, state, local, and 
tribal preparedness and response in coordination with the National Response Framework 
(NRF) as the replacement for the NRP. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security provided guidance for the role of the federal government as a larger, but more 
focused role for support (White House HSC, 2007, pp. 33–36). The culture of 
preparedness is addressed through four principles for adoption by the public and private 
sector (White House HSC, 2007, pp. 41–42). The importance of NIMS is further 
discussed in the 2007 strategy through the Incident Command System (ICS) (White 
House HSC, 2007 pp. 46–48). 
The first “DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for Homeland Security” (United States Department of Homeland Security 
[USDHS], 2010b, pp. 71–74) identified maturing and strengthening the homeland 
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security enterprise through many relevant objectives such as building a homeland 
security professional discipline; institutionalizing homeland security planning; further 
enhancing the military-homeland security relationship; strengthening the ability of 
federal departments and agencies to support homeland security missions and maturing 
DHS. 
2. Hurricane Katrina After-Action Reports  
National preparedness became a national priority and focus after the 9/11 attacks. 
However, national preparedness for a major incident was not significantly challenged 
again until Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The federal government’s level of preparedness 
and its subsequent failures were discussed in several federal Hurricane Katrina after-
action reports. 
The White House report, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons 
Learned” (White House, 2006) focused on preparedness throughout the document, 
focusing on the requirements and importance of NRP and NIMS. The White House report 
pointed out that all federal departments and agencies should have NIMS-compliant 
operational command and control structures to strengthen federal capabilities (White 
House, 2006, p. 72). The second recommendation in the White House report stated, 
“DHS should institute a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP for all 
department and agency personnel with incident management responsibilities” (White 
House, 2006, p. 89).  
The United States Senate report “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared” 
dedicated Chapter 12 and other areas to the failure of the federal agencies to be prepared 
for the response and the ramifications in relationship to the NRP (United States Senate, 
2006, pp. 163–189). The United States House report “A Failure of Initiative” also 
focused on the level of federal law enforcement preparedness and response in conjunction 
with NRP and NIMS (United States House of Representatives, 2006). Both 
Congressional reports addressed the implications of a failure to prepare for the hurricane 
and did not exempt the federal law enforcement community from preparedness adherence 
and compliance. 
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The White House and Congressional after-action reports addressed many issues, 
including the importance of preparedness for incident response, but Congress did not 
provide subsequent political influence or legislation to encourage preparedness adoption 
and compliance by the federal departments and agencies. In his November 2005 query of 
the Library of Congress database, Thomas A. Birkland found that the word “Katrina” was 
located in 293 legislative items, with 48 percent of those entries containing the term 
“Hurricane Katrina” in the title of the bill. However, Birkland found that the word 
“preparedness” appeared in only three of the almost-300 Congressional bills (2006, p. 
178). Preparedness remains an area for improved focus within the executive and 
legislative branches. 
The lessons learned regarding preparedness from Hurricane Katrina were not 
limited to the after-action reports from the executive and legislative branches. Donald 
Kettl identified the importance of preparedness and lessons learned when analyzing the 
impact of Hurricane Katrina: 
Following September 11, 2001, public officials everywhere promised that 
the nation would learn the painful lessons the terrorists taught. But 
Hurricane Katrina not only revealed that we have failed to learn, it also 
showed that we have yet to build the capacity to deal with costly, wicked 
problems that leave little time to react. (2006, p. 273) 
But yet again, Katrina taught a fundamental lesson of homeland security. 
Just as was the case on September 11, all homeland security events start as 
local events. The federal response will fail again if it is not part of an 
integrated national—federal, state and local—plan. (2006, p. 283) 
If these lessons are not learned by all levels of government, especially the federal 
government, there is a great likelihood that we will repeat the errors and failures again 
and again. As pointed out by Kettl, we must build the capacity. 
3. NIMS Compliance 
In September of 2004, DHS issued a letter to the federal departments and agencies 
explaining the requirements of HSPD-5 and NIMS. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 letter, as 
posted on the FEMA NIMS Web site, stated that all federal departments and agencies 
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were required to adopt NIMS and use it in their individual domestic-incident 
management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation 
activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist state or local entities 
(USDHS, 2004). By December 31, 2004, each department and agency was to submit a 
plan for the adoption and implementation of NIMS. 
The FEMA NIMS Integration Center, now known as the National Integration 
Center (NIC), has been encouraging NIMS compliance since 2005; it initiated the 
tracking of state, local, and tribal compliance in FY 2007. The NIC provided a state 
implementation matrix and a tribal and local implementation matrix as guidance for 
NIMS compliance. However, a review of the FY 2009 NIMS Implementation Objectives 
identifies 28 implementation objectives for state, local, and tribal agencies, but none for 
the federal government. The FEMA NIMS Web site contains an FY 2007 federal NIMS 
implementation survey without any posted results. Data regarding NIMS compliance by 
federal agencies is not available (USDHS, FEMA, 2010b). 
FEMA utilizes the NIMS Compliance Assistance Support Tool (NIMSCAST), a 
web-based instrument for state, local, and tribal agencies to conduct self-assessments and 
report their jurisdiction’s achievement of all NIMS implementation activities since 2004. 
However, NIMSCAST did not reportedly track federal NIMS compliance until 
approximately FY 2010. The NIC was not able to provide any information regarding 
federal preparedness and NIMS adoption or compliance at the time of this thesis. 
The NIC Incident Management Systems Integration (IMSI) Division issued a 
five-year NIMS training plan in February 2008. The intended audience of the plan was 
identified as federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental 
organizations. The plan does not exclude federal agencies, but existing laws and rules do 
not directly impact funding for any failure to meet the NIMS training requirements. 
In May of 2009, NIC IMSI distributed the draft “NIMS Implementation 




official release to all federal departments and agencies. The NIC ISMI process will 
reportedly assess NIMS adoption and compliance by federal departments and agencies 
since they: 
play an important role in ensuring effective NIMS implementation; not 
only must they implement NIMS within their departments and agencies, 
they must also ensure that the systems and processes are in place to 
communicate and support NIMS compliance at all jurisdictional levels 
(United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. [USDHS, FEMA], 2010a, p. 1)  
The draft plan contains 25 implementation objectives in the following NIMS 
components: adoption; command and management; preparedness; resource management; 
and communication and information management (USDHS, FEMA, 2010a, pp. 2–3). The 
assessment has not been fully initiated to determine the level of federal NIMS adoption 
and training compliance as identified in 2005—a significant influencing factor for this 
thesis research.  
The value of NIMS has been identified in other reports such as the National 
Emergency Communications Plan, which addressed state and local NIMS adoption in the 
area of communications for emergency responder skills and capabilities. The report does 
identify as a gap or obstacle that “some emergency response agencies have not yet 
received NIMS training or have not adopted NIMS policies” (USDHS, 2008e, p. 30). 
The FEMA NIMS training Web site provides conflicting guidance. FEMA states 
that NIMS is applicable to federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement responders. 
However, to the question of to whom NIMS applies, the answer identified on the FEMA 
NIMS training Web site is: “NIMS is applicable to State, tribal and local governments, 
private sector organizations, critical infrastructure owners and operators, 
nongovernmental organizations and other organizations with an active role in emergency 
management and incident response” (USDHS, 2009d). This answer appears to be in 
conflict with the empowering documents but consistent with the apparent current level of 
federal NIMS adoption.  
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Interestingly, the DHS FY 2008 Congressional Budget Justification, Performance 
Budget Overview, Verification and Validation of Measured Values stated that the White 
House collects and reviews information for federal agency NIMS compliance, and states 
input the information into NIMCAST. Later in the same table, the performance measure 
states that NIC verifies all federal agency implementation plans for the implementation of 
NIMS (USDHS, 2008e, pp. A 24–25). 
The DHS Federal Preparedness Report (2009) states that nearly all reporting 
federal departments and agencies assessed themselves as fully compliant with NIMS 
standards (USDHS, FEMA, 2009a, pp. iii–iv). The preparedness report states that NIMS 
has been successfully implemented across the nation as a common incident-management 
framework (USDHS, FEMA, 2009a, p. 12). However later in the report, the federal 
department and agency compliance level was identified as incomplete due to the 
voluntary nature of the NIMSCAST reporting requirements (USDHS, FEMA, 2009a, 
p. 20). According to the report, 68 percent of the federal departments and agencies had 
not reported their compliance as of 2009. 
The DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for Homeland Security (2010) identified ensuring resilience to disasters as 
one of the five primary missions of DHS. The reliance was to be achieved through 
enhanced preparedness, strengthened capabilities, and effective emergency response by 
all levels of government, embracing a common doctrine of NIMS and ICS (USDHS, 
2010b, pp. 60–63). 
More than six years after the release of HSPD-5 and the establishment of NIMS 
for incident response and management activities, DHS released the memorandum “NIMS 
Implementation for Federal Department and Agencies” on May 20, 2010. The 
memorandum repeated the previous FY 2005 guidance that all federal departments and 
agencies were required to adopt NIMS. However, the memorandum later stated that: 
Federal departments, agencies, and other Federal stakeholders should 
implement all relevant actions, answer the metrics, and submit a final self-
assessment via the NIMS Compliance Assistance Support Tool 
(NIMSCAST) by September 30, 2010. (USDHS, 2010a, para. 2) 
(emphasis supplied)  
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Along with the DHS memorandum, FEMA released the accompanying FY 2010 
NIMS Implementation Objectives and Metrics for Federal Departments and Agencies 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2010a) document to provide guidance to the federal departments and 
agencies. The 2010 guidance is consistent with the previous adoption and compliance 
guidance issued by FEMA for federal, state, local, and tribal governments. 
4. Government Accountability Office Reports and Preparedness  
The importance of preparedness training and equipment, and its review and 
oversight, obviously did not start with the release of NIMS, NRP, or NRF. The need for 
these resources and requirements and the addition of federal capabilities to respond to 
terrorist attacks have been identified in various Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) publications, including the 1999 GAO report “Combating Terrorism: 
Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism.” GAO recommended that 
federal agencies take steps to ensure that government-wide priorities are established and 
that resources are budgeted and allocated based on threat and risk assessments 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 1999a, p. 14). In the 1999 GAO report 
“Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs,” the GAO stated 
that “the emergence of more federal response elements and capabilities will increase the 
challenge for the federal government to provide a well-coordinated response in support of 
a state or local incident commander” (GAO, 1999b, p. 9). 
The 2000 GAO report “Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide 
Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination” continued the focus 
on the linking of recommended federal preparedness actions and budget resources. The 
GAO stated that, “Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate 
budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national strategy with 
clearly defined outcomes” (GAO, 2000a, p. 26). 
According to another pre-9/11 GAO report, “Combating Terrorism: FEMA 
Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and Response,” FEMA 
increased preparedness training and coordinated extensively with responsible federal 
agencies on terrorism issues (GAO, 2001a, p. 10). 
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The development of NIMS addressed many, but not all, of the issues identified by 
GAO in the pre-9/11 reports, but not necessarily on the federal level. Achieving NIMS 
compliance through training and adoption of the concept in agency plans and policies is 
often the first step in the preparedness process. The culture of preparedness requires a 
larger strategic view for its adoption, as referenced in many GAO reports. In the 2002 
GAO report “National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local and Private 
Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security,” the 
importance of preparedness for federal, state, and local agency efforts was addressed not 
long after the 9/11 attacks. The GAO report provided several relevant findings regarding 
the federal government and preparedness: 
The success of a national preparedness strategy relies on the ability of all 
levels of government and the private sector to communicate and cooperate 
effectively with one another (Yim, 2002, p. 8); 
State and local response organizations believe that federal programs 
designed to improve preparedness are not well synchronized or organized 
(Yim, 2002, p. 10.); and 
The design of federal policy will play a vital role in determining success 
and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to achieve critical 
national goals. (Yim, 2002, p. 18)  
According to state and local officials, the driving force to encourage NIMS 
compliance and preparedness has been the restriction of grants and other funding 
assistance to state, local, and tribal agencies without meeting certain requirements. 
However, NIMS training compliance without a strategy and coordination does not often 
result in preparedness. In a 2005 GAO report, “Homeland Security: Managing First 
Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region,” 
the grants were identified as a means to achieve the preparedness goal, but more was 
required to achieve this coordinated preparedness. The GAO recommended the 
development of a strategic plan to coordinate the funds, monitor the expenditures, and 
identify and assess gaps (GAO, 2005b, p. 2). The GAO report identified the importance 
of a strategic plan for the most effective and efficient application and deployment of 
resources. 
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The 2005 GAO report, “Homeland Security—DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First 
Responders’ All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve,” addressed the federal 
challenge of developing and maintaining a national preparedness goal while considering 
the costs and level of government responsible for funding. The report also addressed the 
challenges of self-reported information from various levels of government in aggregating 
and evaluating a national strategy (GAO, 2005a, p. 43). 
The GAO report issued in 2006, “Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary 
Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response and Recovery,” reviewed the challenges 
encountered before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina. The report identified important 
considerations, for example, that DHS should “provide strong oversight of federal, state, 
and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support 
preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional 
basis” (GAO, 2006c, p.15). The GAO report does not exempt the federal government 
from planning, training, and exercising requirements to support preparedness, response, 
and recovery. The federal government is viewed by the GAO as a partner in the process. 
The 2006 GAO report, “Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and 
Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents,” stated that sustained leadership 
and coordinated stakeholder efforts are required to assess, develop, attain, and sustain 
preparedness (GAO, 2006b, p.15). The report did not exclude the federal government as a 
stakeholder for preparedness and response. On the contrary, according to GAO, 9/11 
fundamentally changed the context of emergency management preparedness in the 
United States, including federal involvement in preparedness and response (GAO, 2006b, 
p. 1).  
In 2006, GAO issued the report, “Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, 
Capabilities and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery System,” to assess the three basic elements of 
leadership, capabilities, and accountability. As with many other studies, this report 




report identified recommendations such as providing guidance for federal preparedness 
planning and training and monitoring federal agency efforts to meet NRP and NIMS 
responsibilities (GAO, 2006a, p. 99). 
The 2007 GAO report, “Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA 
Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 
Related Recommendations and Legislation,” evaluated the changes since Hurricane 
Katrina in the areas of roles and responsibilities, capabilities and accountabilities (GAO, 
2007b, p. 2). The GAO report identified improvements but also the challenges still 
existing for all levels of government. The 9/11 attacks resulted in the subsequent issuance 
of billions of dollars in grants and assistance, but the 2005 hurricane season resulted in 
the reassessment of the federal role in preparedness and response (GAO, 2007b, p. 27). 
The 2007 DHS GAO report, “Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report 
on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,” GAO reviewed 171 
performance expectations. The GAO had made approximately 700 recommendations to 
DHS to strengthen homeland security operations. GAO identified 24 emergency 
preparedness and response performance expectations for which 18 were not achieved 
according to the report (GAO, 2007a, p. 125). The report gave credit to DHS for 
developing and enhancing NIMS, but it criticized DHS’s inability to fully verify the level 
of state, local, and tribal NIMS training compliance (GAO, 2007a, p. 132). However, the 
actual level of federal compliance was not addressed by GAO. 
5. Congressional Research Service Reports and Preparedness 
In addition to GAO reports and findings, the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) assessed preparedness in several relevant reports. The CRS report, “Emergency 
Management Preparedness Standards: Overview and options for Congress,” addressed 
the adoption of ICS nationwide in 2005. CRS addressed the state and local training, 
resource, funding, and response issues (Bea, 2005a, pp. 13–17). The CRS report 
addressed the importance of NIMS and ICS compliance for state, local, and tribal 
agencies without directly addressing the federal agencies’ training and implementation 
compliance. The report concludes: 
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It is also possible that the actions taken by Congress will stimulate and 
maintain a commitment of non-federal resources and capabilities by 
funding programs, encouraging DHS and the states to incorporate 
standards in their operational procedures, and more fully engage in 
emergency management activities. (Bea, 2005a, p. 23) 
The CRS 2005 report “Organization and Mission of the Emergency Preparedness 
and Response Directorate: Issues and Options for the 109th Congress” reviewed the DHS 
second-stage review changes, including FEMA. The report identified the preparedness 
authorities in other federal agencies (Bea, 2005b, pp. 21–23). The report recommended 
many options to improve preparedness, such as a new federal office to ensure that federal 
emergency preparedness and response actions are coordinated and not duplicative (Bea, 
2005b, p. 54). 
The CRS report “Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After 
Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions” addressed many post-2005 
hurricane-season issues in this 2006 document. The CRS report addressed federal 
preparedness, stating that the DHS is not the only “agency” responsible for having the 
capability to comply with NIMS and to train response personnel (Bea, 2006, pp. 33–34). 
The CRS 2008 report “Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the National 
Exercise Program: Background, Policy Implications, and Issues for Congress” addressed 
the concern about the sufficiency of current preparedness policies and responsibilities. 
The report focused on preparedness and its assessment through exercises and the 
confusion of various empowering laws and plans designating responsibility (Peterson, 
2008, pp. 27–29). 
6. Financial Incentives 
Financial incentives appear to influence preparedness adoption and NIMS 
compliance as a driving force beyond the basic appreciation of the concept. HSPD-5 
directs federal departments and agencies to make state and local NIMS adoption a 
requirement for providing federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, and 
other activities beginning in FY 2005 (White House, 2003a, Goal 20). HSPD-8 provides 
guidance regarding the requirements for awarding federal preparedness assistance and 
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equipment to state and local governments (White House, 2003b, Goals 8–16). Federal 
departments and agencies are directed to utilize NIMS compliance in the award of grants 
and assistance to state, local, and tribal agencies. 
DHS announced FY 2009 grant guidance for over $3 billion in preparedness grant 
funding through 14 programs in November of 2008. The purpose of the state and local 
government funding was to strengthen community preparedness. The DHS Homeland 
Security Grant Program, FY 2009 Overview (USDHS, 2008a, p. 1) identified the 
following seven preparedness programs within the Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP): 
• Homeland Security Grant Program; 
o State Homeland Security Program; 
o Urban Areas Security Initiative; 
o Metropolitan Medical Response System; 
o Citizen Corps Program; 
• State Homeland Security Program Tribal; 
• Nonprofit Security Grant Program; and 
• Operation Stonegarden Grant Program.  
According to the HSGP FY 2009 Overview, FEMA’s comprehensive collection 
of grant programs is an important part of the government’s larger, coordinated effort to 
strengthen homeland security preparedness according to NIMS, NRP, and the National 
Preparedness Guidelines and National Infrastructure Preparedness Plan (USDHS, 2008a, 
p. 1). The overview also identified another 10 grant programs administered by DHS. The 
grants were limited to eligible recipients within state, local, and tribal governments. As of 
FY 2010, HSGP does not provide a funding or motivating method for the federal law 
enforcement community. 
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FEMA Information Bulletin No. 338, Fiscal Year 2010 Program Guidance and 
Application Kits (USDHS, FEMA, 2009b, p. 1) stated that over $2.7 billion was available 
to state, local, and tribal governments for grant funding through the following federal 
programs:  
 
•  Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) Program; 
•  Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program; 
•  Driver’s License Security Grant Program (DLSGP); 
•  Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP); 
•  Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP); 
•  Port Security Grant Program (PSGP); 
•  Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP); 
•  Intercity Passenger Rail—Amtrak (IPR) Program; 
•  Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP); 
•  Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP); 
•  Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program (THSGP); 
•  Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Nonprofit Security Grant Program 
(NSGP); and  
•  Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP).  
None of the grant programs above identified the federal law enforcement 
community as being eligible for funding access. 
A review of numerous state emergency management Web sites documented the 
NIMS requirements and sources of information for compliance to become eligible for the 
HSGP (see Chapter III). The two factors of greatest influence identified at the Web sites 
were the benefits of the Incident Command System (ICS) within NIMS and access to the 
federal grant programs. NIMS training compliance has been more consistent within the 
fire service due to its long history of ICS in emergency response. 
Emergency management is a complex policy subsystem that involves an 
intergovernmental, multiphased effort to prepare for disasters. Donahue and Joyce (2001, 
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p. 728), report that the current rules for budgeting may inappropriately promote focus and 
spending on disaster response and recovery rather than preparedness. The various 
homeland security preparedness grants listed above have been developed since 2001 to 
better focus on preparedness, rather than response. 
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) was enacted to 
improve accountability within the federal government and to enhance its budget for the 
benefit of the taxpayer. According to Butterworth and Metzger (1998, p. 35), GPRA 
required agencies to end the practice of managing activities with little or no attention to 
their consequences. Through their annual plans, federal agencies were to establish levels 
of measurable performance targets to attain their objectives. 
As stressed by Jonathan D. Bruel (2009, p. 71) in discussing the impact of GPRA, 
“To become a high-performing enterprise, government needs to transform the culture of 
its organizations to work closely with other governments, nonprofits, and the private 
sector, domestically and internationally, to achieve results.” However, GPRA has not had 
an observable affect on the federal law enforcement community in the area of 
preparedness adoption and compliance, but an analysis of its implementation and impact 
since 1993 may assist in the study of this subject if GPRA can be determined as relevant 
for this issue. 
7. Federal Preparedness Adoption and Compliance 
In 2006 and 2007, a federal law enforcement agency developed and released nine 
national emergency preparedness polices to direct and encourage preparedness within the 
agency. The policies resulted from an assessment of the agency’s response to Hurricane 
Katrina and the lessons learned regarding the importance of preparedness. Several of the 
policies remain partially implemented by the agency, especially regarding NIMS training 
compliance and policy modification for NIMS adoption. In 2007, a large portion of the 
law enforcement field managers were instructed to complete the basic NIMS training via 




employees have completed all of their recommended preparedness training in an agency 
of approximately 20,000 employees. The exact number of employees is not known since 
it is not nationally tracked by FEMA or the agency. 
Subsequent research indicated that another federal law enforcement agency 
estimated that fewer than 2,000 of their approximately 50,000 employees have completed 
all of the required NIMS training. The exact number of employees is not known since it 
is not nationally tracked by FEMA or the second agency. 
A search of the Web sites of many of the largest federal law enforcement agencies 
did not provide documentation regarding their adoption of NIMS or its training 
requirements (see, e.g., Web sites for FBI, http://www.fbi.gov; ATF, http://www.atf.gov; 
DEA, http://www.justice.gov/dea/index.htm; USSS, http://www.secretservice.gov/; and 
USMS, http://www.justice.gov/marshals/). However, one department with a smaller law 
enforcement component did possess an available and applicable policy with NIMS 
guidance and direction. The Department of Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
developed a plan, Environmental Safeguards Plan for All-Hazards Emergencies, that 
addressed preparedness, NRP, and NIMS compliance (United States Department of 
Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2009, pp. 4–5). 
Research located federal departments and agencies without significant law 
enforcement components that have adopted NRP and NIMS preparedness requirements. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) implemented NRP and NIMS into its 2007 
“Emergency Management and Fundamentals and the Operational Emergency Base 
Program—Emergency Management Guide” policy document adhering to the basic 
national preparedness requirements and recommendations. According to DOE: “The 
DOE NIMS implementation plan was published in February 2005, requiring all 
Departmental elements to complete implementation of NIMS by September 30, 2005, or 
when their surrounding jurisdictions implemented NIMS” (United States Department of 
Energy [USDOE], 2007a, pp. 16–18). The DOE “Programmatic Elements—Emergency 
Management Guide” also addressed the NRP and NIMS adoption and compliance 
guidelines (USDOE, 2007b). 
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The Department of Health and Human Services identified NIMS adoption, 
utilization, and compliance in its policies, guides, Web site, and press releases. The HHS 
Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations oversees the NRP- and NIMS-related 
responsibilities according to the HHS Organizational Manual (United States Department 
of Health and Human Services [HHS], HHS policy manual, AN-2.AN-3). HHS also 
encouraged responders such as Medical Reserve Corps personnel to become NIMS 
compliant. 
8. Future Expectation for Emergency Declarations 
Due to his research regarding presidential disaster declarations during floods, 
Richard T. Sylves (2005, p. 8) has stated, “Modern presidents face immense pressure by 
legislators and by nonfederal officials to approve even marginal requests for presidential 
disaster declarations. Increased media coverage of disasters, especially by national 
broadcasts, is today a major intervening variable in a president’s approve or reject 
calculus. Changes in disaster law have expanded eligibility for declarations and for a 
wider variety of disaster causes.” The increase in disaster declarations over the years has 
not been limited to major flooding incidents. 
In his research on the use of federal emergency declarations for disasters, Matt A. 
Mayer found a growing increase in their use since the 1950s, especially since the early 
1970s. Mayer found that, from 1972 to 1979, the number of emergency declarations per 
year had doubled from the preceding 20 years. After the creation of FEMA in 1979 and 
the passing of the Stafford Act in 1988, the federal government’s involvement in disaster 
response continued to increase. Between 1980 and 1992, FEMA was involved in an 
average of 33 emergency declarations a year. From 1993 to 2001, FEMA’s involvement 
in disasters increased to an average of 89 declarations a year. FEMA involvement in 
disasters increased to an average of 130 declarations a year between 2001 and 2009 
(Mayer, 2009, pp. 96–97). 
Mayer believes that the increase in the use of emergency declarations over the 
years was the result of the federal government’s willingness to fund incident 
preparedness, response, and recovery for political purposes, resulting in reduced planning 
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and preparedness by state and local governments. According to Mayer, “the fundamental 
reality is that the current federalization of disasters is about nothing more than money and 
politics.” (2009, p. 100) As an advocate of federalism, Mayer believes that state and local 
governments should plan and prepare to handle their own incidents without federal 
involvement, except for the most serious disasters, in order to maintain their capability to 
serve their citizens. 
Sylves (2005, p. 6) concurs with Mayer’s concerns that “governors are tempted to 
ask for declarations in advance of the onset of disaster because they reason that county 
and municipal disaster response will be more robust if federal subsidization of response 
costs is assured ahead of time.” This strategy for state and local preparedness can 
question the seriousness of the governors in promoting preparedness and their definition 
of being overwhelmed during an incident, requiring federal support and funding. 
In his research regarding the president’s emergency powers, Sylves found that 
approximately 66 percent of the presidential declaration requests submitted by the 
governors were approved and approximately 34 percent were denied between May 1953 
and December 2003 (2005, p. 8). The one-third of the requests that were denied during 
this time period may have contained incidents considered too marginal or insufficient for 
disaster acceptance by the president, even with the possible political benefits. 
If these trends continue, the federal law enforcement community can expect an 
increase in responses to support state, local, and tribal governments during disasters with 
emergency declarations. The apparent low level of appreciation for preparedness 
adoption and compliance may be troublesome for the federal law enforcement 
community if state, local, and tribal governmental expectations maintain their current 
level or continue to increase in the future. 
9. The Value of NIMS 
Even though the importance of preparedness adoption and compliance, especially 
through NIMS, has been identified in numerous national directives, plans, policies, 
studies, and after-action reports, there are differing points of view on the value of NIMS. 
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Critics of NIMS and ICS frequently question whether the incident command structures 
can facilitate the intergovernmental, multiorganizational, and intersectoral collaboration 
necessary for large-scale disasters (Waugh, 2009, p. 159). William L. Waugh continues: 
Now, local and state responders are required to adopt ICS and to be 
compliant with NIMS to qualify for federal funds and to receive federal 
disaster assistance. The implementation of ICS has not been without 
critics, but NIMS has drawn far more criticism. Critics have tried to draw 
attention to the shortcomings of such hierarchical, command-focused 
systems, the problem of command when no one has (or many have) legal 
and political authority, and the resources and response capacities that are 
not accommodated by closed administrative systems. (2009, p. 165) 
With the release of NIMS in a post-9/11 world, questions also exist as to whether 
it is too focused on terrorism. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina may have moved the 
NIMS pendulum back towards the natural-disaster side of the spectrum for a more all-
hazards focus. This shift can be observed in the changes in homeland security priorities 
between the terrorism focus in the National Strategy for Homeland Security (White 
House OHS, 2002) and the all-hazards focus in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (White House HSC, 2007). 
The appropriate balance of NIMS in the all-hazards world will continue to be the 
topic of many important and healthy discussions and debates in the future by responders 
and policy makers alike, especially after each significant incident. However, these 
debates and discussions should not be carried on at the expense of the implementation of 
NIMS and ICS training. As identified by Waugh, “Adequate training and experience are 
necessary for ICS to work, and that is a significant problem when many agencies do not 
use ICS and those that do may not use it often, even to maintain a trained cadre” (Waugh, 
2009, p. 174).  
But why is preparedness adoption and compliance truly important, or even 
relevant, for the federal law enforcement community? Is NIMS really an essential part of 
the various missions and duties of the federal law enforcement community? Research and 
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experience1 reveal that preparedness adoption and compliance are important for the 
federal law enforcement community and our nation for two primary reasons: 
• The federal government is a critical component of the national incident 
response and management strategy to support state, local, and tribal 
governments during significant man-made attacks and natural disasters. As 
previously documented, the number of significant incidents and disasters 
receiving federal support has been increasing over the past 40 years and will 
likely continue to increase in the future unless cultural, political, and financial 
preparedness perspectives change; and 
• NIMS and ICS provide important knowledge, skills, and abilities to enhance 
coordination, cooperation, and collaboration within and between the 
departments and agencies during their daily interagency operations and joint 
incident responses on the federal level. 
The value of NIMS for the federal law enforcement community can be debated by 
leadership and policy makers since emergency response is not the primary responsibility 
of many federal departments and agencies. However, federal departments and agencies 
need to be prepared to respond to incidents under their jurisdiction and to support other 
federal, state, local, and tribal agencies during significant incidents when existing 
resources are insufficient or overwhelmed.  
If the federal law enforcement community does not expect to respond to another 
significant national incident to support its state, local, and tribal partners in the future, 
research and analysis reveal that those in that position have not adequately studied the 
past or properly anticipated the current trends for the future. Until a new preparedness 
and response system is established, developed, and implemented, NIMS is the national 
process designated for successful planning, preparedness, and response. 
                                                 
1  The writer was the acting director and deputy director for the national incident response unit of a 
DHS law enforcement agency for two years and oversaw the agency response to Hurricane Katrina. The 




Homeland security grants and other federal funding sources have affected and 
influenced state, local, and tribal preparedness adoption and compliance levels, especially 
in the NIMS and NRF environment. However, preparedness adoption and compliance 
have not been achieved within the federal law enforcement community. If the financial 
incentives through federal grants have influenced and driven the state, local, and tribal 
governments to preparedness adoption through NIMS compliance, then a federally 
focused funding source, outside the existing budgeting process, would likely produce 
similar results for the federal law enforcement community. At this time, there is no 
specifically directed financial mechanism such as HSGP to encourage the federal 
government to adhere to its own preparedness mandates, recommendations, and 
requirements, other than their existing budgets. 
It is important that policy and decision makers nationwide consider a new concept 
of financial incentives to enhance preparedness within the federal law enforcement 
community. An analysis of the costs and benefits of preparedness adoption and 
compliance would provide relevant and beneficial information for department and agency 
leadership to consider when addressing this homeland security issue. Preparedness 
adoption and compliance could also reduce possible exposure to legal liability claims 
against the federal law enforcement community by its employees and the public.  
When the old sticks do not work, it is time for a new, innovative carrot to resolve 
this homeland security challenge. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The significance of this research lies in the development and evaluation of a novel 
conceptual policy and plan to encourage preparedness adoption and compliance within 
the federal law enforcement community in order to strengthen national capabilities. The 
current policies and practices have not proven effective for widespread NIMS and NRF 
adoption and implementation. 
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This thesis will provide a method to assess some of the costs and benefits of 
preparedness adoption and compliance by the federal law enforcement community to 
assist policy and decision makers in the executive and legislative branches. This research 
will be of benefit to leadership within the federal government in determining the 
resources and efforts required to adhere to the preparedness requirements and 
recommendations. This research may also benefit department and agency leadership by 
presenting the importance of this subject for their review and consideration. 
State, local, and tribal agencies, along with private organizations, could benefit 
from the increased level of federal preparedness adoption and compliance that might 
result from this thesis. Enhanced preparedness could also assist the federal law 
enforcement community to better plan for, prepare for, respond to, and manage incidents 
and events, both domestic and international, with other federal civilian and military 
organizations in a more effective and efficient manner in order to enhance resilience. 
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Through an analysis of the current policies and an evaluation of projected costs 
and benefits, this thesis will address the development of a novel financial incentive for 
the federal law enforcement community. The literature review establishes the foundation 
of the preparedness requirements and recommendations identified in many national 
directives, plans, policies, studies, after-action reports, and other relevant documents.  
The first step was to examine the influence of preparedness requirements, 
recommendations, and financial incentives for state, local, and tribal governments that 
resulted in NIMS adoption and compliance. This analysis served to identify the 
influencing factors for preparedness adoption and compliance by the state, local, and 
tribal agencies, including costs and benefits, and including state emergency-management 
agency Web sites and their guidance.  
The second step was to examine the ramifications of potential legal liability 
should the federal law enforcement community fail to adopt and comply with 
preparedness requirements and recommendations. This analysis served to explore the 
current implications and ramifications associated with the failure to train employees for 
the responsibilities that can be anticipated by a department or agency, including those 
associated with emergency preparedness and response during a significant incident. Case 
law was analyzed to identify possible future liability for a department or agency for 
failure to train its employees, including the potential for a significant legal determination 
of deliberate indifference in the context of civil-rights litigation claims. 
The third step was to analyze the financial costs and benefits of a generic federal 
law enforcement agency adherence to NIMS preparedness requirements, with a specific 
focus on the training requirements and their costs and benefits to a department or agency. 
The costs and benefits of the preparedness adoption and compliance recommendations 
and requirements were researched to provide a comprehensive understanding for the 
agency leader and policy maker through a generic agency example focusing on the  
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potential training costs. This step served to demonstrate that the benefits of preparedness 
requirements and recommendations outweigh the costs by producing benefits on several 
levels. 
Finally, the issues, information, and data from the previous steps were synthesized 
to develop a new federal incentive concept to expand benefits and reduce costs for the 
departments and agencies. The financial incentive concept provides a framework of goals 
and milestones with linked financial incentives to encourage department and agency 
accomplishments and subsequent achievements. 
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III. STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL COMPLIANCE 
NIMS preparedness adoption and compliance by state, local, and tribal 
governments have been encouraged by access to federal grants through many of the 
documents identified in the literature review, as well as the FEMA requirements and 
guidance issued for each fiscal year. The importance of NIMS and its training 
requirements was identified for grant access in the DHS Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland 
Security Grant Program—Program Guidelines and Application Kit. According to the 
2005 HSGP document, “the NIC is working with federal departments and agencies to 
ensure that they develop a plan to adopt NIMS and that all FY05 federal preparedness 
assistance program documents begin the process of addressing state, territorial, tribal, and 
local NIMS implementation. All HSGP award recipients and their SAAs (State 
Administrative Agency) must coordinate with other state agencies, tribal governments, 
and local jurisdictions to ensure NIMS implementation.” (USDHS, Office of State and 
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, Office of Domestic Preparedness, 
2005, p. 46) The 2005 HGSP document identifies the minimum NIMS preparedness 
training and compliance requirements starting in Fiscal Year 2005. 
The DHS Fiscal Year 2009 Homeland Security Grant Program—Guidance and 
Application Kit (USDHS, 2008c, p. 26) further clarifies the preparedness requirements: 
To be eligible to receive FY 2009 HSGP funding, applicants must meet 
NIMS compliance requirements. The NIMSCAST will be the required 
means to report FY 2008 NIMS compliance for FY 2009 preparedness 
award eligibility. All State and territory grantees were required to submit 
their compliance assessment via the NIMSCAST by September 30, 2008 
in order to be eligible for FY 2009 preparedness programs. The State or 
territory department/agency grantee reserves the right to determine 
compliance reporting requirements of their sub-awardees (locals) in order 
to disperse funds at the local level.  
The influence of these requirements and grants can also be identified in the 
information provided by the state emergency management Web sites regarding 
preparedness adoption and compliance for access to federal funding. Table 1 identifies 
the following: 
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• Whether the state references the NIMS training requirements on the Web site; 
• Whether the state identifies the NIMS requirements for access to federal 
grants and grant information links; and 
• Whether the state links or references the national NIMS documents, guidance 
or Web sites for additional information. 
Table 1.   List of State Web Sites Regarding NIMS and Grants 
STATE NIMS FUNDING LINKS WEB SITE REFERENCES 
Alaska X X X http://www.ak-prepared.com/, http://www.ak-
prepared.com/grant_forms and 
http://ready.alaska.gov/training/links.htm 
Alabama X X X http://ema.alabama.gov/ and 
http://ema.alabama.gov/Organization/Preparedness/NI
MS.cfm 





Arkansas X X X http://www.adem.arkansas.gov/ and 
http://www.adem.arkansas.gov/documents/portal/SHS
GP/index.html 
California X X X http://cms.calema.ca.gov/preparednesshome.aspx and 
http://cms.calema.ca.gov/prep_em_nims.aspx  
Colorado X X X http://www.dola.state.co.us/ and 
http://www.dola.state.co.us/dem/nims_implementation.
pdf 















Georgia X X X http://www.gema.ga.gov/ohsgemaweb.nsf/  
Hawaii X X X  http://www.honolulu.gov/dem/, 
http://www.honolulu.gov/csd/budget/20ocda.pdf and 
http://www.honolulu.gov/dem/homelandsecurity.htm 





Illinois X X X  http://www.state.il.us/iema/index.asp and 
http://www.state.il.us/iema/training/training.asp 
Indiana X X X http://www.in.gov/dhs/index.htm, 
http://www.in.gov/dhs/2559.htm and 
http://www.in.gov/dhs/grants.htm 




Kansas X X X http://www.kansas.gov/kdem/, 
http://www.kansas.gov/kdem/nims/ and 
http://www.kansas.gov/kdem/grants/ 




Louisiana X X X  http://gohsep.la.gov/default.aspx, 
http://gohsep.la.gov/nims.aspx and 
http://gohsep.la.gov/hsgrantprgindex.aspx 





Maryland X X X http://www.mema.state.md.us/MEMA/index.jsp and 
http://www.mema.state.md.us/NIMS/index.jsp 
http://www.mema.state.md.us/NIMS/index.jsp#  





















Mississippi X X X http://www.msema.org/training/ and 
http://www.homelandsecurity.ms.gov/training_links.ht
ml 
Missouri X X X http://sema.dps.mo.gov/nimscast1.htm and 
http://sema.dps.mo.gov/terrorism.htm 
Montana X X X http://dma.mt.gov/des/Training/MT%20TEP%202008-
2010_FINAL.pdf and 
http://dma.mt.gov/des/homelandsecurity/ 













New Jersey X X X http://nims.nj.gov/ and 
http://nims.nj.gov/overview.html 





New York X X X http://www.semo.state.ny.us//programs/training/ICS/IC
Sexplain.cfm  




North Dakota X X X http://www.nd.gov/des/homeland/ and 
http://www.nd.gov/des/training/ 
Ohio X X X http://ema.ohio.gov/NimsGuidance.aspx and 
http://ema.ohio.gov/PreparednessGrantsBranch.aspx 
















Rhode Island X X X http://www.riema.ri.gov/, 
http://www.riema.ri.gov/preparedness/training/ and 
http://www.riema.ri.gov/prevention/grants/ 
South Carolina X X X http://www.scemd.org/ and 
http://www.scemd.org/Library/NIMS/intro.html 





Tennessee X X X http://www.tnema.org/, 
http://www.tnema.org/ema/training/index.html and 
http://www.tnema.org/ema/grants/index.html 















Virginia X X X http://www.vdem.state.va.us/, 
http://www.vaemergency.com/programs/nims/index.cf
m and http://www.vaemergency.com/grants/index.cfm 





West Virginia X X X http://www.wvdhsem.gov/, 
http://www.wvdhsem.gov/training.htm and 
http://www.wvdhsem.gov/more_resources.htm 
Wisconsin X X X http://emergencymanagement.wi.gov/, and 
http://emergencymanagement.wi.gov/nims/default.asp 
Wyoming  X X http://wyohomelandsecurity.state.wy.us/main.aspx and 
http://wyohomelandsecurity.state.wy.us/grants.aspx  
 
An analysis of Table 1 indicates that all of the state emergency-management 
agency Web sites identify the importance of NIMS adoption and compliance for state, 
local, and tribal agencies to be eligible to receive federal grants and other funding. The 
state Web sites provide information regarding the FEMA training requirements and links 
to other Web sites to obtain additional information. The consistency of the three linked 
categories and the importance placed on them on the Web sites indicates that NIMS 
adoption and compliance were associated with access to federal funding. 
In addition to the recognition of NIMS compliance for federal grant access by the 
50 states, professional associations also provide guidance to their members. In National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) Guide for County Officials (2006, p. 3), the 
National Association of Counties and International Association of Emergency Managers 
advised that all federal preparedness assistance was contingent on the states’ compliance 
with NIMS to gain access to HSGP, Emergency Management Performance grants, and 
the Urban Area Security Initiative as of October 1, 2006.  
The International Association of Chiefs of Police, through the Police Chief 
magazine, identifies the importance of NIMS compliance to receive federal funding 
(LeBlanc, 2006, p. 2) and the HSPD-5 requirements beginning in FY 2005 for NIMS 
compliance for grant access (Herron, 2004, p. 4). The International Association of Fire 
Chiefs (IAFC), through its Web site, identifies the importance of NIMS compliance for 
grant and funding access (Gardner, 2010, para. 9) and the HSGP Fiscal Year 2006 goals 
for implementing NIMS in the fire service (IAFC, 2005, para.1-8).  
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Analysis in this chapter reveals that NIMS adoption and compliance by the state, 
local, and tribal governments have been influenced by the access restrictions for federal 
grants and other funding sources. The state administrative agencies, functioning as 
primary points of contact for grant recipients, provide the guidance and direction to the 
local and tribal governments. According to the various Web sites and research above, the 
benefits of access to federal funding have outweighed the costs of NIMS preparedness 
adoption and compliance for state, local, and tribal agencies. Due to the amount of 
federal funds distributed to compliant state, local, and tribal agencies each year, NIMS 
preparedness adherence, truly valued or not by the organizations, is an important driving 
factor. 
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IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL LIABILITY 
In addition to the NIMS preparedness requirements, an analysis of the numerous 
preparedness strategies, plans, policies, and other documents and references identified in 
the literature review establish potential legal liability for claims of failure to train and 
deliberate indifference against a federal department or agency. The totality of the 
preparedness documents and after-action reports provides evidence that the federal law 
enforcement community is not formally exempted or excepted from national training 
requirements, including NIMS and NRF preparedness adoption and compliance training. 
Previous court cases document that, if appropriate or required training is not provided and 
subsequent injury occurs, the department or agency may become liable for the actions of 
its organization and employees through the legal concepts of failure to train and 
deliberate indifference. 
A. FAILURE TO TRAIN 
One of the earliest relevant law enforcement failure-to-train court cases was 
Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979). In Popow, the federal court 
held that the agency was liable for the failure to train its officers in the use of deadly 
force. Discounting the city’s defense that additional use-of-force training was too 
expensive, the trial court imposed a six-figure judgment for damages against the city 
(Scuro, 2002, p. 12). 
Eight years later, in Fronk v. Meager, 417 N.W. 2d 807 (N.D. 1987), the court 
held that if an agency provides a tool to an officer, it must provide training to go with it. 
Fronk v. Meager may be relevant when a federal department or agency provides 
equipment or supplies to its employees without proper training for an immediate incident 
response such as the 9/11 attacks or Hurricane Katrina.  
In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the 
federal agency “should furnish the kind of training for its law enforcement agents that  
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would entirely eliminate the necessity for the Court to distinguish between the conduct 
that a competent officer considers reasonable and the conduct that the Constitution deems 
reasonable.” 
In the often-cited decision City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), 
the Supreme Court ruled that a municipal government may, in certain circumstances, be 
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from failure to 
train its employees. Although this decision related to training for a local police 
department regarding the rendering of medical assistance, it created a frequently 
referenced foundation for the more serious claim of deliberate indifference to 
constitutional rights within case law. 
In Robinson v. City of St. Charles, Missouri, 972 F. 2d 974 (8th Cir. 1992), the 
court held that, in order to prevail on a policy or training claim, the plaintiff must show 
that the government agency had notice that its training was inadequate and deliberately 
chose not to remedy the situation (Ross, 2000, p. 176). The Robinson decision should be 
considered by the federal government as a basis for possible future litigation. 
In Buttram v. United States, No. 96-0324-S-BLW (D. Idaho 1999), the trial court 
found a federal agency and local fire department negligent and the proximate cause of the 
death of two firefighters in 1995. The court found that the fire department had failed to 
ensure the safety of the firefighters, provide adequate equipment, properly train them, and 
advise the federal agency of the limited training and experience of the firefighters. The 
federal agency and the fire department were both found responsible for their deaths 
during the wildfire. Nicholson, a law professor specializing in emergency response, 
argues that keeping responders as safe as possible eliminates an important potential 
source of agency liability (Nicholson, 2003, p. 323). The Buttram decision provides an 
interesting citation involving a federal agency. 
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In the case of Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F. 3d 418 (D.C.C. 1996), the 
District of Columbia court of appeals held that even a single incident was sufficient to 
support the complaint of inadequate training and supervision (Ross, 2000, p. 176). The 
court further held that alleging an additional instance of misconduct would not 
necessarily improve the notice to the agency.  
Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 
397 (1997) suggested liability for failure to train a single officer (Spector, 2001, p. 73). 
Even though the county was not held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court found that 
“[c]laims such as the present, which do not involve an allegation that the municipal 
action itself violated federal law or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal 
rights, require application of rigorous culpability and causation standards in order to 
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for its employees’ actions.” The 
governmental entity’s liability would rely on the adequacy of the training program in 
relation to the tasks the employees must perform (Spector, 2001, p. 74). 
The importance of training was also addressed in Allen v. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 
119 F. 3rd 837 (10th Cir. 1997), which involved use of force and law enforcement 
response to dangerous situations. In Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F. 3d 366 (5th 
Cir. 2010), the court found that, for an alleged failure to train claim to succeed, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that:  
(1) the agency’s training policy procedures were inadequate;  
(2) the agency was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy; and  
(3) the inadequate training policy directly caused the violation that was the basis 
for the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.  
Even though the Sanders-Burns claim failed, the ruling continued to address the 
issue of training personnel and deliberate indifference by a department or agency. 
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B. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
Beyond the accusation of failure to train, a finding of deliberate indifference may 
be more serious in that it can result in stronger consequences for a department or agency 
that has been provided notice of a training issue and chooses to ignore the need or 
requirement. “Deliberate indifference” has been defined as “the conscious or reckless 
disregard of the consequences of one's acts or omissions” (USLegal). In the early case of 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court found that deliberate 
indifference can result in an agency’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court ruled 
that it was only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
In the Supreme Court case of Monnell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 
658 (1978), the court found that municipalities and other governmental bodies are 
persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1963 for civil rights violations and liability of 
their personnel under certain circumstances. The Monnell decision was referenced in 
many of the subsequent court decisions regarding failure-to-train and deliberate-
indifference claims against law enforcement agencies. 
The deliberate indifference standard was expanded in Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 
F. 2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989), when the court identified numerous training deficiencies and 
issues indicative of deliberate indifference. Even though Bordanaro involved significant 
use-of-force issues, it further established case law regarding failure to train and deliberate 
indifference. In Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990), the court 
found that the absence of training was a deliberate and conscious choice by the agency. 
The court also found that agencies must abide by the Constitution regardless of what 
other agencies do or fail to do. The Doe decision may be relevant for a claim against a 
specific federal department or agency since being part of a larger noncompliant group 
would not provide legal justification or coverage to evade liability. 
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In Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, Colorado, 997 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1993), 
the court found the city was deliberately indifferent as a result of its inadequate training 
regarding the use of deadly force. In the ruling, the court referenced evidence from an 
outside source that should have placed the city on notice for this training inadequacy. The 
numerous documents referenced in the literature review could be viewed by future 
plaintiffs as repeated previous notices by outside sources to the federal law enforcement 
community of possible inadequate preparedness training according to NIMS and NRF. 
According to Martin J. King (2005, p. 23), referencing the Supreme Court case 
Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 
(1997), “deliberate indifference is a standard of fault that requires a showing that 
government policy makers acted with conscious disregard for the obvious consequences 
of their actions.” King continues: “If a training program does not prevent constitutional 
violations and a pattern of injuries develops, officials charged with the responsibility of 
formulating policy for the agency may be put on notice that a new program is needed and 
a failure to address the problem may constitute deliberate indifference.”  
To prevail on theory that an agency is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on 
failure to train, the plaintiff must show that the failure to train rose to the level of 
deliberate indifference, according to Huffman v. City of Prairie Village, Kansas, 980 F. 
Supp. 1192 (D. Ks.1997). In Johnson v. Cincinnati, 39 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Ohio 1999), 
the court found that the city was deliberately indifferent in failing to adequately train the 
police. An agency may be found liable for the failure to train subordinate officers where 
such failures reflect a policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of 
citizens according to Garcia v. County of Bucks, Pennsylvania, 155 F. Supp. 2d 259 
(E.D. Pa. 2001). In the case of Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 385 F. Supp. 2d 
626 (S.D. Ohio 2004), the court found that the failure to train individual police officers 
on the proper meaning and application of policies regarding medical care rose to the level 
of deliberate indifference. 
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A study by Darrell L. Ross (2000, p. 180) revealed that deliberate indifference 
regarding training can be difficult to prove in court with only one-third of the cases being 
successful, but the average award for successful claims was $450,000 as of 2000. It is 
anticipated that the average award value has increased since 2000. 
As stated by King (2005, p. 30), “Although deliberate indifference is most often 
found in cases that involve inaction in the face of a pattern of prior similar constitutional 
violations, a failure to act that results in a single unprecedented incident can support a 
finding of deliberate indifference where the constitutional violation was a highly 
predictable consequence of failure to train.” 
C. SHORTAGE OF RESOURCES 
Beyond receiving the appropriate preparedness training according to policies and 
procedures, it is critical to properly document that training for tracking and subsequent 
reviews and audits. As found by Charles Dahlinger (2001, p. 54), “In order to protect 
themselves against claims, some very basic procedures can be utilized to help minimize 
and defend departments and their officers. First and foremost, a good clear 
documentation of training is a must.” A large portion of the benefit of training could be 
lost when it is not properly documented to ensure adherence by an entire department or 
agency. 
As documented in Popow and other court rulings, a limited budget for training 
does not alleviate an agency from training requirements and standards. In McClelland v. 
Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979), the court found that budgetary constraints that 
limit training are not a valid defense. The budgetary-limitations-for-training argument 
was also encountered in Brown v. Bryan County, Oklahoma, 219 F.3d 450 (2000) with 
negative results for the agency where the court upheld the lower court ruling and jury 
finding that the training policy of the agency was so inadequate as to amount to deliberate 
indifference. Even though it may have been a budgetary reality, the lack of funding for 
training did not relieve a department or agency of liability. 
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D. POTENTIAL LIABILITY 
Research for this subject identified other cases for which arguments and claims of 
deliberate indifference regarding training were unsuccessful, but the case law above 
provides a foundation of rulings that could be utilized against the federal law 
enforcement community regarding its preparedness training for future NIMS- and NRF-
related mission assignments and response for incidents. Even though few of the cases 
listed above are directly on point for the federal government, they would likely be 
utilized in an attempt to establish new case law in the future for alleged constitutional and 
civil rights violations. 
Strong leadership within the federal law enforcement community is crucial to 
enhance the level of preparedness within those departments and agencies and to reduce 
future legal liability. As stated by Nicholson (2003, p. 327), “When individual agencies 
within a unit of government refuse to fulfill their legal duties, whether in preparedness or 
in response, the responsibility for fixing the situation lies squarely on the shoulders of the 
unit of government’s leader.” As history has demonstrated in the past 20 years, the 
federal law enforcement community will be required to respond to significant man-made 
and natural incidents in the future that require the knowledge, skills, and abilities 
obtained from NIMS and NRF preparedness adoption and compliance. 
The costs of preparedness training would likely be minor as compared to the 
possible financial and political consequences of a successful lawsuit against a federal 
department or agency. The benefits of preparedness adoption and compliance would 
likely be larger than the investment when a tort claim is lost, as documented in the 
research by Ross. 
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V. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL ADOPTION AND 
COMPLIANCE 
The costs and benefits of preparedness adoption and acceptance for a department 
or agency can vary, but the primary areas for consideration are often financial and 
political due to the purview of Congress. Although important for all of the federal law 
enforcement community, the departments and agencies with DHS may have the most to 
gain by preparedness adoption and compliance in the eyes of Congress and the public. As 
found by Clovis (2006, p. 10), regarding DHS, Congress provides more oversight of DHS 
than it does the Department of Defense, which has a budget 10 times larger. As a result, 
the benefits for a department or agency, especially DHS, which adheres to Congressional 
mandates and expectations can be great, as can be the costs of failure. The fact that the 
federal law enforcement community has not adhered to the requirements and 
recommendations in the numerous documents and references in the literature review does 
not mean that Congress is fully aware of this or has modified its expectations of the 
federal government’s preparedness during a major incident response. 
However, Congress may possess a level of responsibility for the current status of 
preparedness adoption and compliance within the federal law enforcement community 
through inadequate prioritization, monitoring, and support. As stated by Amy K. 
Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy (2006, p. 10), politicians tend to respond to more 
immediately pressing social and political demands, deferring investment in emergency 
preparedness until a major incident reawakens public concerns. Unfortunately, high-
profile incidents and the resulting media attention generate opportunities to make changes 
because public fear and complaints prompt politicians to support improvements 
(Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p. 10). The challenge is to identify the lessons learned and to 
execute the changes prior to the loss of interest by the government, Congress, and public.  
Preparedness adoption and compliance by the federal law enforcement 




avoidance of the national preparedness requirements and recommendations. According to 
David L. Weimer and Adian R. Vining (1999, p. 341), the valuation of policy outcomes 
is based on the concept of willingness to pay: 
Benefits are the sum of the maximum amounts that people would be 
willing to pay to gain outcomes that they view as desirable; 
Costs are the sum of the maximum amounts that people would be willing 
to pay to avoid outcomes that they view as undesirable. 
Thomas A. Birkland (2006, p. 30) has stated that policy makers must calculate the 
costs of learning from a major incident against the likelihood that an incident would 
occur again during their tenure. Birkland continues: if a major incident was not expected 
during the policymakers’ tenure, the benefits that would accrue from the considerable 
efforts in learning and improving policy performance would not benefit them in the near 
term. Birkland’s observations may be an influencing factor as to why so many 
department and agency leaders have failed to adhere to the preparedness requirements 
and recommendations, according to research and FEMA reporting. 
The financial costs of preparedness acceptance for the department or agency 
involve the existing operating costs of operation for the organization, along with any 
additional costs necessary for adoption and compliance without another source of 
funding. The most tangible costs may be the basic salary of employees while they are 
completing designated preparedness training during business hours and any impact to 
their assigned duties. Since the salaries would be expended during daily operations, there 
would be limited or no anticipated additional cost to the department or agency. 
The incorporation of the preparedness requirements and recommendations into 
the organizational culture would likely be minimal since they would be included in the 
standard operations of the organization in the development and design of policies, plans, 
procedures, and budgets. 
The political costs of the failure of preparedness adoption and compliance have 
not been significant for the federal departments or agencies, as documented in many 
after-action reports. However, the political costs may greatly increase during and after a 
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major incident should the ramifications of the preparedness failures become evident to 
Congress and public. The political costs of Hurricane Katrina resulted in the removal of a 
FEMA director and a persistent impression that the federal government was inadequately 
prepared to respond to the natural disaster. Subsequent responses— such as to a 
significant oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico and an earthquake in Haiti—have reinforced 
this impression. 
The benefits of acceptance would be adherence to national requirements and 
recommendations, resulting in an enhanced preparedness level for daily operations 
utilizing beneficial ICS concepts and the future incident response and support. There is 
also a likely benefit to leadership of not being identified in future FEMA, GAO, or Office 
of Inspector General reports for noncompliant organizations. There is an anticipated 
benefit to not being included in the future FEMA federal preparedness reports, especially 
after a major incident with an inadequate federal response. 
A. NIMS COMPLIANCE TRAINING 
1. FEMA Training Guidance 
According to the National Incident Management System (NIMS): Five-Year 
NIMS Training Plan (USDHS, FEMA, 2008b, p. iii), “A critical tool in promoting the 
nationwide implementation of NIMS is a well-developed training program that facilitates 
NIMS training throughout the nation.” The NIMS training plan continues: 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) represents a core set 
of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational 
processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident 
management across all emergency management and incident response 
organizations and disciplines. The President of the United States of 
America has directed Federal agencies to adopt NIMS and encouraged 
adoption of NIMS by all stakeholders—Federal, State, territorial, tribal, 
sub-state regional, and local governments, private sector organizations, 
critical infrastructure owners and operators, and nongovernmental 
organizations involved in emergency management and/or incident 
response. (USDHS, FEMA, 2008b, p. 1) 
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The intended audience for NIMS training includes federal, state, local, tribal, 
private sector, nongovernmental agencies, and other organizations that may plan for, 
prepare for, or respond to an incident. The core curriculum NIMS training courses are 
identified as awareness, advanced, and practicum, based on the expected level of learning 
of the student (USDHS, FEMA, 2008b, p.16). 
The basic preparedness training required to meet the NIMS guidelines for the 
federal law enforcement community is identified in Table 2. The level of preparedness 
training depends on the duties of the personnel and the policies of the department or 
agency, but the courses in Table 2 provide the basic training to establish an operational 
understanding of NIMS, including NRF, for preparedness adoption and compliance 
according to FEMA (USDHS, FEMA, 2009e). Although the courses can be completed in 
a shorter period of time, the FEMA-estimated completion times have been utilized in 
order to evaluate the costs. 
Table 2.   Basic NIMS/NRF Training Curriculum (USDHS, FEMA, n.d.)  
COURSE TRAINING HOURS FORM PREREQUISITE RECOMMENDATION 
IS-100.LEa ICS-100 3 Online None Agency Responders 
IS-200.a ICS-200 3 Online IS-100 Agency Responders 
IS-700.a NIMS 3 Online None All Employees 
IS-800.b NRF 3 Online None All Employees 
G-300 ICS-300 24 Classroom ICS-100\200 Supervisory Responders 
G-400 ICS-400 16 Classroom ICS-300 Supervisory Responders 
 
According to FEMA, the first four preparedness courses in Table 2 were to be 
completed by FY 2006 (USDHS, FEMA, 2009e).  
FEMA provides additional NIMS online preparedness training courses to enhance 
department and agency preparedness. Although not required to meet basic preparedness 
training according to FEMA guidance, the courses in Table 3 may be of benefit to 
department and agency personnel to better plan, prepare, and respond to incidents, events, 
and situations. 
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Table 3.   Advanced NIMS Training Curriculum  
COURSE TRAINING HOURS FORM PREREQUISITE RECOMMENDATION 
IS-701.a MACC 2.0 Online N/A  Designated Personnel 
IS-702 PIO 3.0 Online N/A Designated Personnel  
IS-703.a Resource Man. 3.5 Online N/A  Designated Personnel 
IS-704.a Communications 3.0 Online IS-700  Designated Personnel 
IS-706 Mutual Aid 2.5 Online IS-700  Designated Personnel 
IS-775 EOC Operations 4.5 Online N/A  Designated Personnel 
 
In addition to the agency benefits for the completion of this important NIMS 
preparedness training provided by FEMA, employees have the opportunity to receive 
college credit for completed independent study courses. FEMA established a relationship 
with a Maryland community college to apply the credits toward an associate’s degree, 
certificate, or letter of recognition in emergency management 
(EmergencyManagementStudy.com, 2010). The community college identified the 
rewards of the training as college credits, job advancement, performance appraisals, and 
personal satisfaction. 
2. Federal Salary Costs 
To evaluate the training costs for a department or agency utilizing the FEMA 
online training Web site and classroom-delivered training, the hourly salary cost for each 
course may provide valuable information. An analysis of the hourly cost of a step-1 
employee, without including the cost of benefits, in the table below (United States Office 
of Personnel Management, 2010) demonstrates the estimated salary cost of an employee  
completing the online and classroom training identified in the table above. Even though 
the costs may be negligible and expended during daily operations, the costs are useful for 
consideration to better understand the impact on organizational resources. 
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Table 4.   Salary Costs by Hour for NIMS Training 
 
As stated by the White House in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina—
Lessons Learned (2006, p. 72), “Training is not as costly as the mistakes made in a 
crisis.” The operational and political benefits of this training would likely outweigh the 
existing salary costs to a department or agency in the possible political-consequence 
world to avoid being identified in another White House after-action report. 
B. POLICY, PLAN AND PROCEDURE ADHERENCE 
The costs of incorporating preparedness concepts and requirements into 
department and agency policies, plans, and procedures may involve no additional costs to 
develop or modify the documents prior to scheduled development or review. However, 
departments and agencies may find it necessary to obtain additional support from 
supplemental staff or contractors to expedite the process to meet the preparedness 
requirements and recommendations through policies, plans, and procedures. The costs of 
the additional support, which may be short-term, would vary depending on the level  
 
 
GRADE HOURLY RATE 3 HOURS 16 HOURS 24 HOURS 
GS-5 $13.14 $39.42 $270.24 $315.36 
GS-6 $14.65 $87.90 $234.40 $351.60 
GS-7 $16.28 $48.84 $260.48 $390.72 
GS-8 $18.03 $54.09 $288.48 $432.72 
GS-9 $19.92 $59.76 $318.72 $478.32 
GS-10 $21.93 $65.79 $350.88 $526.32 
GS-11 $24.10 $72.30 $385.60 $578.40 
GS-12 $28.88 $86.64 $462.08 $693.12 
GS-13 $34.34 $103.02 $549.44 $824.16 
GS-14 $40.58 $121.74 $649.28 $973.92 
GS-15 $47.47 $142.41 $759.52 $1139.28 
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required to meet the goals. Due to the variance in existing federal contracts and the 
amount of assistance required, it is difficult to estimate the actual costs for a department 
or agency. 
In his analysis of the political costs of failure during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
Waugh (2006, p. 22) states: 
There are political costs and, for local officials, potential legal costs that 
might be exacted if they fail to prepare for and respond adequately to a 
disaster. A means for addressing the risk of legal liability and mitigating 
potential political costs is adherence to accepted national standards.  
The benefits of incorporating preparedness into department and agency policies, 
plans, and procedures can be vast, ranging from basic adherence to empowering 
personnel to be prepared for future assignments and responsibilities with reduced legal 
liability exposure. The political benefits of policy, plan, and procedure adherence could 
be significant for an organization that is not the subject of interest by Congress during or 
after incident hearings and commissions. 
C. COMPLIANCE MONITORING 
The costs associated with the monitoring of preparedness adoption and 
compliance depend on the structure of the department or agency. If the organization has 
an existing policy or preparedness unit, the monitoring and reporting could be 
incorporated into it along with current GPRA tracking requirements; additional resources 
may be required to execute these duties. If the department or agency does not have this 
capacity, a designated unit or office may need to be developed, equipped, and trained to 
provide this service. 
The benefits of this compliance monitoring, via a designated unit or office, would 
be the ability to document achievements and compliance for planning and for future 
audits. Through compliance monitoring, areas for enhancement can be identified to 




that fails to train its employees, compliance monitoring plays an important role in 
reducing exposure to unpleasant and time-consuming questions, hearings, and court 
cases. 
D. EXERCISES 
The costs of an exercise often depend on the capabilities of the department or 
agency and the size and complexity of the exercise. A local table-top exercise will likely 
require far less in resources than a full-scale or national-level exercise. No matter the 
scale, the exercising of NIMS preparedness is a part of the FEMA guidance to federal, 
state, local, and tribal agencies via their yearly implementation guidance. As stated by the 
White House in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina—Lessons Learned (2006, p. 
72), “At all levels of government, we must build leadership corps that is fully educated, 
trained and exercised in our plans and doctrine.”  
The actual costs of exercises for a federal department or agency may be difficult 
to estimate without the adoption of preparedness requirements to determine their 
priorities, capabilities, and responsibilities. On adherence to preparedness requirements 
and the identification of trained employees, an exercise schedule can be developed to 
meet department, agency, and national guidelines and goals. According to FEMA 
exercise guidance, the National Exercise Program (NEP) provides an organized approach 
to set priorities for exercises, reflects those priorities in a multi-year schedule of exercises 
that serves the strategic and policy goals of the United States government, and addresses 
findings from those exercises through a disciplined interagency process (USDHS, FEMA, 
2009f). The NEP establishes the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) as the exercise methodology and tools to support the NEP. 
FEMA’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing Web site (USDHS, FEMA, 
2010c) is a source of information to obtain best practices and lessons learned from 
incident and exercise after-action reports. The reference Web site can assist a department 
or agency in the development of an exercise to evaluate the possible costs and benefits, to 
include reducing costs and increasing benefits by learning from other organizations. The 
FEMA Web site contains a vast library of homeland security plans, procedures, 
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templates, and tools from jurisdictions across the nation, which provides its members 
with a valuable resource when they are developing or revising plans and procedures for 
their organizations. 
The benefits of an exercise depend on the quality of the design in conjunction 
with the priority placed on it by the department or agency. The return or benefit of an 
exercise often corresponds with the investment of the department or agency. An 
important result of exercises is to expose deficiencies so that they can be examined and 
corrected, but fear of retribution or penalties impede honest reporting (Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006, p. 16). The ability of a department or agency to exercise its capabilities 
prior to an incident is crucial to better preparing the organization for a safe and successful 
response. Just as it is unlikely that any teams in professional sports enter the field without 
practicing their plays, the federal law enforcement community should be no different, for 
the stakes are much higher. 
When exercises, especially at the national level, are designed and developed, they 
must be relevant to generate interest by the players and to provide a benefit at an 
acceptable cost for the participating organizations. Unfortunately, exercise procedures are 
typically simplified, compared to how their actual unfolding in a real event, in order to 
meet time and resource limitations (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p. 15). In the past, some 
national exercises have not always provided benefit for the costs required to participate in 
them. According to Spencer Hsu (2010, p. A1) in his article “National disaster exercises, 
called too costly and scripted, may be scaled back,” the current administration is 
evaluating the costs of the current national-level exercises for the benefits that they 
produce. The drills have grown into unrealistic, costly, and over-scripted productions, 
DHS Secretary Napolitano has said, an “elaborate game” rather than an opportunity for 
officials to work through problems. 
Although the costs and benefits of exercises will likely be disputed from various 
positions, the importance of exercising a department or agency’s preparedness level will 
always be important to determine its readiness for a future incident. Time has 
demonstrated the perils of responding without a plan or appropriate skill set. 
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E. SAMPLE AGENCY TRAINING COSTS 
The most immediate and tangible costs associated with preparedness adoption and 
compliance are identified through the training costs for the department or agency. The 
estimated training cost of an agency of 5,000 employees, including 2,500 law 
enforcement officers is set forth in Table 5. The average salary cost of a GS-11 is used 
for the general employee and agency responder estimate; GS-14 is used for supervisory 
responders. 
Table 5.   Average Agency Salary Costs for Training 
COURSE HOURS SALARY  EMPLOYEES TOTAL COSTS RECOMMENDATION 
IS-100.LEa 3 $24.10  2,500  $180,750 Agency Responders 
IS-200.a 3 $24.10  2,500 $180,750 Agency Responders 
IS-700.a 3 $24.10 5,000  $361,500 All Employees 
IS-800.b 3 $24.10  5,000  $361,500 All Employees 
G-300 24 $40.58  250 $243,480 Supervisory Responders 
G-400 16  $40.58 250  $162,320 Supervisory Responders 
 
The total cost for the average agency listed above would be less than $1,500,000 
in existing basic salary costs to achieve NIMS training compliance. Since these are not 
necessarily additional costs due to existing budgets for the salary of employees, the 
benefits may be greater on any subsequent benefit of the training compliance, including 
the funding available from the federal financial incentive concept identified in 
Chapter VI. 
Salary costs are the easiest to estimate due to the known number of employees, 
courses, and time requirements. The cost of incorporating preparedness adoption and 
compliance in the area of policy development, compliance monitoring, and exercises is 
more difficult to estimate due to the differing structure and capabilities of the 
departments and agencies. Departments and agencies with a more robust infrastructure 
would be able to better adhere to the requirements as compared to others with limited 
capabilities. The good news is that many preparedness adoption and compliance costs are 
often one-time costs for long-term benefits. 
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VI. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVE CONCEPT 
The importance of preparedness adoption and compliance for the federal law 
enforcement community was identified in Chapter I. The impact of federal grant access 
for state, local, and tribal governments was studied in Chapter III. The possible costs of 
the failure to train and deliberate indifference and the benefits of legally defensible 
training were addressed in Chapter IV. The costs and benefits for a federal department or 
agency to adhere to national preparedness requirements and recommendations were 
discussed in Chapter V. The costs and benefits of preparedness adoption and compliance 
can be evaluated by a department or agency through these chapters, but adherence may 
still be elusive. 
If the previous national preparedness strategies, plans, and guidance have not 
provided sufficient motivation for NIMS adoption and compliance, a novel federal 
financial incentive concept may encourage an increased culture of preparedness within 
the federal law enforcement community to achieve a preparedness level consistent with 
its state, local, and tribal partners. Through the framework below, the novel federal 
financial incentive concept would be developed and implemented to address the 
preparedness deficiency. 
A. FRAMEWORK 
The framework for this federal financial incentive concept consists of the 
preparedness goals consistent with NIMS and FEMA guidance to be achieved by each 
department or agency. The goals are met by reaching the concept milestones. The initial 
investment to reach the first milestone is funded by the department or agency with 
funding from its existing general budget. Once milestone levels are achieved during a 
designated time period, such as a fiscal-year quarter, a portion of the concept funds is 
immediately distributed directly to the successful departments or agencies for their use to 
further preparedness achievement. The concept funding could not be used for purposes 
other than further improving and enhancing the department or agency’s preparedness 
adoption and compliance to attain the next milestone according to an approved 
 52
department or agency concept preparedness plan. The concept is designed to continue 
enabling the departments or agencies to utilize the dedicated funding from each 
achievement milestone to the lessons-learned level and preparedness compliance. 
1. Goals 
The goals are consistent with NIMS guidance provided to federal, state, local, and 
tribal agencies by FEMA. 
a. Adopt NIMS (ICS) as the agency’s all-hazards incident management 
system through clear direction and guidance to agency personnel; 
b. Adopt NRF as the agency’s response framework, in conjunction with 
NIMS, through clear direction and guidance to agency personnel;  
c. Identify responsible agency component(s) to oversee, monitor, 
document, and report confirmed agency preparedness achievements; 
d. Develop and modify policies, plans, procedures, and guidance for the 
implementation of NIMS and NRF;  
e. Complete and document NIMS and NRF preparedness training as 
designated by FEMA or another qualified organization, to include IS-
100-LEa, IS-200a, IS-700a, and IS 800b (or their equivalents); 
f. Report completed NIMS and NRF preparedness training and other 
relevant achievements to the FEMA NIC NIMSCAST (and\or 
designated organization or process); 
g. Develop inter-agency agreements, as required, with federal, state, 
local, and tribal agencies and organizations; 
h. Develop inter-agency agreements, as required, with nongovernment 
organizations and private sector entities; 
i. Develop standard operating procedures, as required, with other 
federal, state, local, and tribal agencies and organizations; 
j. Develop standard operating procedures, as required, with 
nongovernment organizations and private sector entities; 
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k. Conduct exercises to evaluate agency’s preparedness and ability to 
coordinate and collaborate with other agencies; 
l. Develop after-action reports and lessons learned after incidents, 
deployments and exercise; and 
m. Identify areas for improvement and develop plans of action to address 
deficiencies. 
2. Milestones 
The milestones are a combination of the goals for attainment to achieve levels of 
preparedness and reward. 
a. Preparedness Adoption 
The establishment and implementation of a preparedness plan for 
the adoption of the concept goals listed above through a formal 
department or agency mandate would document the achievement of this 
milestone through agency directive and leadership. 
b. Identification of Responsible Official 
The formal identification and designation of the official(s) within 
the department or agency component responsible for preparedness 
implementation, execution, oversight, documentation and reporting to 
ensure adoption and compliance would achieve this milestone. 
c. Training Completion 
The coordination, documentation and reporting of the required 
preparedness training for designated personnel to FEMA NIC NIMSCAST 
and\or designated superceding organization or process. 
d. Policies, Plans, and Procedures 
The development of new department or agency policies, plans, and 
procedures that adhere to and support preparedness requirements and 
recommendations to include NIS and NRF. The consideration of 
preparedness requirements and recommendations in the review or 
modification of existing policies, plans, and procedures. 
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e. Exercises and Lessons Learned 
After-action reports are completed after exercises and incident 
responses to analyze deficiencies and document lessons learned. The 
lessons learned are utilized to review, improve, and enhance the 
department or agency preparedness programs. 
3. Financial Incentives 
The financial incentives are divided into a point system to provide an 
understandable common process for the award of incentive funding to the departments 
and agencies. The use of a point structure establishes a common framework to reward 
achieving applicants to support fairness and transparency. The point system also permits 
departments and agencies to be rewarded for multiple milestones during an evaluation 
period for a larger percentage of the available funding.  
When a department or agency achieves the milestone through documentation and 
verification, a point value is given to the achievement. At the end of the quarter, the 
designated amount of funding is divided among the departments and agencies according 
to their point value. If five departments or agencies each earned two points, each would 
receive 20 percent of the quarterly funding. 
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Table 6.   Concept Milestones 
Milestones Points 
Preparedness Adoption 2 
Responsible Official 1 
Basic Training Completion (IS-700 and IS-800) 3 
Responder Training Completion (IS-100 and IS-200)  3 
Advanced Training (ICS-300 and ICS-400) 4 
Policies, Plans, and Procedures 5 
Exercises and Lessons Learned 3 
 
The departments and agencies would be responsible for submitting the required 
documentation with evidence of milestone completion to be eligible to receive their 
designated preparedness funding. The format and guidance for the submissions would be 
developed and distributed by the managing organization to ensure full compliance, to 
include auditing as appropriate. 
The federal financial incentive concept could be funded at any level determined as 
appropriate by Congress. As an example, the concept could be funded with $100,000,000 
during this first year as a pilot program. This example amount is a fraction of the FY 
2010 federal preparedness funding available to state, local, and tribal agencies. For its 
first quarter below, four departments or agencies have accumulated the following points 
to gain access to the $25,000,000 available for distribution. 
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Table 7.   Sample Funding Distribution for Concept 
AGENCY POINTS PERCENTAGE FUNDING 
A 2 .12 $3,000,000 
B 4 .24 $6,000,000 
C 5 .29 $7,250,000 
D 6 .35 $8,750,000 
 
Each department or agency would receive the funding identified above to enhance 
its preparedness program(s) to better adhere to national requirements and 
recommendations. The funding could be utilized to achieve additional milestones for 
additional preparedness funding within the designated parameters of the financial 
incentive concept. Using the example above, the rewards or benefits for achieving 
concept milestones greatly outweigh the initial costs by the department or agency, 
especially with the sample agency and its salary costs required for the NIMS training 
compliance. 
The development of the concept would require additional considerations on 
authorization, such as placing the federal law enforcement departments and agencies into 
groups according to their size or history of response to significant national incidents. The 
use of such a grouping would provide a more level playing field for the actions required 
to achieve the milestones. However, having all departments and agencies competing on 
the same level might motivate the larger ones to achieve preparedness adoption and 
compliance at a faster rate. 
B. FUNDING 
Congress could fund this new concept as a budget line in the same manner as 
HSGP, with restrictions for access by the federal departments and agencies for designated 
preparedness adoption and compliance outside of existing departments and agency 
budgets. Funding, including the appropriate operating costs, would be provided to the 
designated organization for implementation and oversight. This funding concept would 
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be new for the federal law enforcement community outside of its annual budgets with the 
intent to better support the anticipated Stafford Act response activities conducted by the 
federal departments and agencies to assist state, local, and tribal agencies during 
significant incidents. 
As stated above, the first year of this concept could be funded at a hypothetical 
level of $100,000,000 for the federal law enforcement community. This level of funding 
may appear significant, but it is less than four percent of the FY 2010 federal 
preparedness grant funding. To conserve funding in difficult fiscal times, this funding 
could be part of the current HSGP and directed to the federal partners for enhanced 
partnership with the state, local, and tribal governments during FEMA mission 
assignments. The funding would be divided into four quarters for distribution to further 
encourage timely adoption and compliance during the fiscal year, rather than for a fiscal 
year. If funding is awarded quarterly, the incentive to achieve milestones might be 
greater, especially during a fiscal year where a department or agency would benefit from 
additional resources. 
This concept could be funded for a limited time period, as required to meet the 
milestone achievements. It is anticipated that the concept would be funded for a period of 
two to three years to afford the opportunity for the federal law enforcement community to 
achieve preparedness adoption and compliance. The concept would not be extended 
beyond this short period so as to ensure that it does not become an anticipated outside 
funding source, rather than an innovative incentive concept for change within the federal 
law enforcement community. 
This novel federal financial incentive concept could provide Congress with a pilot 
program to assess alternative funding methods for the federal government to encourage 
specific productivity and program results. This unique funding concept could provide a 
process to meet designated goals with expedited financial incentives. If this concept were 
successful, it might provide an alternate funding framework for other projects and 
programs within the federal government. 
 58
C. OVERSIGHT 
The concept outlined above could be managed by an organization within the 
legislative or executive branch, such as the FEMA Grant Program Directorate (GPD), in 
conjunction with NIMSCAST coordination for preparedness adoption and compliance 
tracking. This concept could also be managed by a homeland security–related nonprofit 
association or educational organization as an independent entity, such as the Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security. However, a 
nongovernment entity might require additional resources and authorities to execute the 
mission. The intent of the concept is to ensure that the administrative costs are as low as 
possible in order to direct the funding to the departments and agencies. 
FEMA GPD currently functions as the “one-stop-shop” for FEMA grant 
management, according to the FEMA Grant Programs Directorate Strategic Plan—Fiscal 
Years 2009-2011 (USDHA, FEMA, 2008a, p. 2). FEMA GPD financially managed over 
$10,000,000,000 for 50 grant programs in FY 2007. FEMA GPD also programmatically 
managed over 7,000 individual grants, totaling over $4,000,000,000 in preparedness 
funds. Due to its experience, FEMA GPD would have the knowledge and infrastructure 
to either execute this concept or provide support to the managing organization. 
The managing organization would be responsible for receiving, reviewing, and 
approving the preparedness plans and milestone achievement documentation from the 
departments and agencies to ensure compliance with the program. The managing 
organization would also ensure that the appropriate preparedness adoption, compliance, 
and adherence results were documented in NIMSCAST. The managing organization 
would be responsible for reviewing the documentation and certifying that milestones 
have been achieved to be eligible to receive the appropriate funding. The managing 
organization would have the authority to audit the departments and agencies to ensure 
that the submitted documentation was correct and accurate. At the end of each quarter, 




The importance of preparedness adoption and compliance for the federal law 
enforcement community did not begin with the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the Hurricane 
Katrina response, but both incidents function as important drivers for change and 
identified lessons learned for federal, state, local, and tribal governments. As with the 
aftermath of many incidents and their subsequent after-action reports, the recurring 
question remains: Will the lessons be learned? As stated by Birkland (2006, p. 189): 
Time will tell whether the “lessons” of Katrina being bandied about in the 
popular and technical media and in the federal, state, and local 
governments are actually learned and translated into policy, or are simply 
observed and filed away until the next disaster causes policymakers and 
reporters to rediscover these original “lessons.” 
Even though state, local, and tribal governments are often the first responders to a 
significant incident or event, the federal government is not relieved from preparedness 
adoption and compliance requirements and responsibilities. A review of disaster 
declarations over the past 40 years demonstrates that the federal government will be 
expected to respond to a growing number of both domestic and international incidents. 
With the increase of federal involvement in incident response and support, federalism 
within homeland security continues to evolve. As stated by Clovis (2006, p. 17), 
regarding “collaborative federalism for homeland security”: 
Homeland security is a national issue requiring national solutions. 
Therefore, the role of Congress and its executive agent, DHS, is that of 
facilitation and leadership, providing guidelines, milestones, and enough 
funding to make a difference. 
As Clovis stresses, the national facilitation and leadership that provides 
guidelines, milestones, and funding should not be limited to state, local, and tribal 
governments for national solutions to homeland security. The federal government is an 
important partner beyond emergency and disaster funding. Only through collaboration at 
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all levels of government will the country achieve the best possible level of preparedness 
to avoid inefficiencies and unnecessary risk (2006, p. 18). 
The federal law enforcement community needs to learn from the experiences of 
the state, local, and tribal agencies to develop its preparedness plans to ensure successful 
integration and interaction. For the nation to improve its preparedness capabilities, all 
levels of government must learn from the experiences and accomplishments of other 
organizations. It can be difficult for agencies to perceive the experience of others as 
relevant to their own responsibilities and operations, and it can be hard to prioritize these 
lessons over the daily problems that an agency confronts in its own jurisdiction (Donahue 
& Tuohy, 2006, p. 11). 
The challenge for department or agency leadership is to understand and appreciate 
the costs and benefits of preparedness adoption and compliance, including the reduction 
in possible legal liability for the organization and its employees. Beyond the logic of 
being prepared and ready, leaders should consider the possible legal ramifications of their 
policy decisions. Nicholson (2003, p. 326) found that if planning and preparedness steps 
are required by law, failure to fulfill the statutory mandate may be the basis for liability.  
As stated by Donahue & Tuohy (2006, p. 21), “If lessons learned become a 
priority for leaders, then they have a better chance of becoming a priority for the 
organizations. Lessons learned must be vertical with federal agencies that commit to 
identifying and learning the lessons that are relevant to them.”  
The usefulness and applicability of NIMS and ICS will likely be discussed and 
debated by responders, policy makers, and academics for years to come. NIMS and NRF 
will likely evolve over the years with the lessons learned from small and large incidents. 
Nevertheless, until our national preparedness strategies, policies, and plans are modified 
or enhanced for the challenges of the future, NIMS and NRF are the current strategies 
requiring adoption and compliance for our national preparedness—including the federal 
law enforcement community.  
Waugh (2006, p. 23) addressed incentives and political costs associated with 
preparedness:  
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If lessons learned are not drawn from the Katrina and Rita experiences, 
corrections will not be made. If officials are not given incentives to repair 
the national emergency management system, little will be done. For the 
officials who failed to address the hazards and/or failed to respond 
adequately, there may be serious political costs. The hurricanes provided a 
window of opportunity, and that window will begin to close as the 
memories of the disasters fade. 
As stated by Michael McGuire (2009, p. 72) when addressing the need for 
professionalism in emergency management: “The increasing size and scope of disasters 
and emergencies suggest that no longer can a community rely on untrained 
nonprofessionals to prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from disasters.” 
This need or requirement for trained emergency management professionals includes all 
partners at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. All incidents may begin and end 
locally, but the responses may require broader resources from various levels of 
government to be successful and truly serve the public. 
Preparedness is encouraged or mandated by the federal government as an 
important segment of homeland security; it needs, therefore, to adhere to its own 
requirements and recommendations as part of the national strategy. The implementation 
of a new federal financial incentive concept similar to HSGP and other grant programs 
should result in enhanced preparedness adoption and compliance consistent with the 
state, local, and tribal governments. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The release of the DHS memorandum “NIMS Implementation for Federal 
Department and Agencies” (USDHS, 2010a) in May of 2010 and the “FY 2010 NIMS 
Implementation Objectives and Metrics for Federal Departments and Agencies” 
(USDHS, FEMA, 2010) document was another important step in the right direction to 
encourage preparedness adoption and compliance by the federal law enforcement 
community. However, the FY 2010 memorandum was largely a restatement of the FY 
2004 memorandum to federal departments and agencies for NIMS adoption and 
compliance. Unfortunately, stating again that federal departments and agencies should 
implement all relevant actions, answer the metrics, and submit a final self-assessment by 
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September 30, 2010, may not provide more encouragement than in the past without 
additional incentives and resources. Since a large-scale emergency response to support 
state, local, and tribal governments during a significant incident is not the primary 
responsibility of the federal law enforcement community, this new funding concept is 
important to encourage and enable the departments and agencies. 
Once the federal law enforcement community enhances its level of preparedness 
adoption and compliance, further research could be conducted to evaluate the actual costs 
and benefits of the achievement. Future study could focus on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of NIMS and NRF during significant incident responses with prepared and 
trained partners on the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Future research could also 
evaluate the costs and benefits of innovative financial incentive concepts in encouraging 
and enabling change within federal departments and agencies outside of their current 
budget process. 
Ignoring the numerous national directives, plans, policies, studies, and after-
action reports regarding preparedness adoption and compliance has not been a shrewd or 
effective strategy for our nation. As Donald F. Kettl (2006, p. 274) stated when 
addressing preparedness and our failure to learn, “If the nation does not learn the lessons 
that both Katrina and September 11 teach, we will suffer the same consequences, over 
and over. In that case, the worst is yet to come.” 
It is recommended that this new federal financial incentive concept be authorized, 
developed, implemented, and funded by Congress with the support of the executive 
branch. With the importance of its role within homeland security, the federal law 
enforcement community can no longer afford to ignore preparedness adoption and  
compliance for the inevitable future responses to man-made or natural disasters. To avoid 
a growing list of after-action reports, studies, hearings, and possible legal action that 
identifies failures and the importance of preparedness, this novel concept should be 
considered and adopted for the benefit of the nation and its citizens. 
When the old sticks do not work, it is time for a new innovative carrot to resolve 
this homeland security challenge. 
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